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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Junior Larry Hillbroom appeals from the district court's order affirming the 
magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In June 2012, the state charged Hillbroom with felony domestic battery 
and attempted strangulation. (Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case No. CR-
2012-02908.) The magistrate court presiding over Hillbroom's arraignment on 
the charges entered a no-contact order between Hillbroom and Candice Fournier, 
the alleged victim. (R., p.32.) The magistrate court did not enter a specific 
expiration date on the order. (See id.) Hillbroom did not object to this omission, 
nor did he move to modify the no-contact order on the ground that it lacked an 
expiration date. 
In September 2012, a member of the Bonner County Sheriff's Office's 
Victim Advocate Service Team observed Hillbroom and Fournier together inside 
of a vehicle in the Bonner County courthouse parking lot. (R., pp.25-26, 31.) A 
responding officer arrested Hillbroom, and the state charged him with 
misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order. (R., pp.25-37.) 
Prior to trial, Hillbroom moved to dismiss the violation of a no-contact order 
charge on the ground that the underlying no-contact order lacked an expiration 
date as required by I.C.R. 46.2, and was therefore void. (R., pp.72-86.) The 
magistrate court denied the motion, concluding: (1) the court's practice of 
omitting specific expiration dates on no-contact orders until and unless the 
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defendant is convicted of the underlying charge complied with I.C.R. 46.2; and 
(2) even if the no-contact order violated the expiration date provision of I.C.R. 
46.2, the order was still valid. (R., pp.115-125.) 
A jury found Hill broom guilty of violation of a no-contact order. (R., p.126.) 
The magistrate court imposed 60 days jail with 55 days suspended, credit for one 
day served, with 32 hours on the sheriff's labor program to be served in lieu of 
the the remaining four days jail, and two years probation. (R., p.127.) Hillbroom 
appealed to the district court. (R., pp.139-140.) 
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the 
magistrate court's denial of Hillbroom's motion to dismiss. (R., pp.169-175.) 
The district court held that while the magistrate court erred in concluding that the 
non-contact order complied with the expiration date requirement of I.C.R. 46.2, 
this non-compliance did not render the order void. (Id.) Hillbroom timely 
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., pp.176-178.) 
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ISSUE 
Hillbroom states the issue on appeal as: 
As a matter of law, can the State prove the crime of violation of a no 
contact order where the no contact order is defective because it 
fails to comply with the mandatory requirement to set out the 
order's expiration date? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hillbroom failed to show that the magistrate court's non-compliance 




Hillbroom Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate Court's Non-Compliance With 
The Expiration Date Requirement Of I.C.R. 46.2 Rendered The No-Contact 
Order Void 
A. Introduction 
Hillbroom contends that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss his charge of violation of a no-contact 
order. (See generally. Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Hillbroom contends that the 
magistrate court's failure to include an specific expiration date on the underlying 
no-contact order rendered it void, and thus precluded his subsequent conviction. 
(Id.) Hillbroom's contention fails because while the magistrate court's non-
compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 provided him grounds to modify the no-contact order, 
it did not render the order void. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The court on appeal exercises free review over the application and 
construction of a statue, State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 
(Ct. App. 2003), and of a criminal rule, State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 
314, 316 (2004) (citations omitted). 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
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substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kt. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kt_ (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
C. A Court's Non-Compliance With I.C.R. 46.2 Does Not Render A No-
Contact Order Void 
Idaho Code § 18-920 permits entry of a no contact order "[w]hen a person 
is charged with or convicted of' certain delineated offenses including felony 
domestic battery, I.C. § 18-918(2). Section 18-920 does not impose any 
particular requirements on the form of the order. Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, 
however, does contain requirements for no contact orders issued pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 18-920. Specifically, Rule 46.2 provides, in relevant part: 
No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following 
information: 
(1) The case number, defendant's name and victim's name; 
(2) A distance restriction; 
(3) That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or 
upon dismissal of the case; 
( 4) An advisory that: 
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a 
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until 
an appearance before a judge, and the possible penalties for this 
crime, 
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(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, 
The no contact order will remain in effect until further order of the 
court, and 
(c) A subsequent domestic violence protection order will 
supersede the no contact order. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that I.C.R. 46.2 requires all no-contact 
orders to contain a specific expiration date. State v. Cobler, 48 Idaho 769, 771-
773, 229 P.3d 374, 377-378 (2010) (reversing a magistrate court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to modify a no-contact order where the order lacked a 
specific expiration date); see also State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 
(2008) (discussing the rationale and policy reasons behind the I.C.R. 46.2 
expiration date requirement). 
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that while the magistrate 
court's failure to include a specific expiration date in the no-contact order was 
contrary to I.C.R. 46.2, this non-compliance did not render the order void. (R., 
pp.169-175.) A review of the applicable law and relevant policy considerations 
supports the district court's determination. 
First, neither the express language of I.C. § 18-920 nor of I.C.R. 46.2 
compels a conclusion that a no-contact order is rendered void if any of the 
information required by I.C.R. 46.2 is missing or incorrect. Indeed, in order to 
prove a violation of a no contact order, the state is only required to prove: the 
defendant "has been charged or convicted" of one of the delineated offenses, "[a] 
no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho criminal rule," 
that "[t]he person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person in 
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violation of an order," and that before such contact, the defendant had notice of 
the order. I.C. § 18-920(2)(a), (b), (c); ICJI 1282. The state is not required to 
prove that the order satisfied all aspects of I.C.R. 46.2. The Idaho Criminal Rules 
govern all criminal "proceedings" (I.C.R. 1 ), but cannot add required elements to 
criminal statutes. 
Consistent with these principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently held 
that another requirement of I.C.R. 46.2, that no-contact orders contain notice of 
the potential penalties for violating the order, does not "create an element of the 
offense or a condition precedent for the prosecution of the violation of a no-
contact order." Joyner v. State. 2014 WL 6634131 *3-4 (Idaho App. March 27, 
2014). In Joyner, a post-conviction petitioner who had been convicted of 
violating of a no-contact order asserted his appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the validity of the underlying order on the ground that it did 
not comply with the notice of penalties requirement of I.C.R. 46.2. & The Court 
of Appeals held that Joyner failed to show prejudice because such a challenge 
would not have been successful. & ("To be sure, if the legislature intended 
Idaho Code § 18-920(2) to include as an element of the offense that Joyner be 
advised of possible penalties and that the prosecutor prove proper advisement, it 
could have done so in the statutory text. The plain language of section 18-920 
does not impose such a requirement."). Similarly, in the present case, the 
magistrate court's lack of compliance with the expiration date requirement of 
I.C.R. 46.2 did not preclude Hillbroom's subsequent prosecution for violation of a 
no-contact order. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has also addressed the impact of a court 
order's lack of compliance with a court rule in the context of a contempt 
proceeding in In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 580-581, 733 P.2d 795, 
801-802 (Ct. App. 1987). In Reeves, an attorney advised his client not to comply 
with a court's temporary restraining order that did not appear to comply with the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 65(g). kl The Court of Appeals affirmed Reeves' 
contempt conviction, concluding, "an individual may not generally ignore a court 
order with which he disagrees. Rather, he should draw the trial court's attention 
to the alleged error. If his objections are overruled, he should seek certification of 
the issue under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or otherwise pursue an orderly appeal." kl 
While Reeves concerned a contempt conviction, the factual scenario 
described therein illustrates the policy considerations at play in the present case. 
If, as Hillbroom asserts, a lack of compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 renders a no-
contact order void, a felony domestic battery defendant could willfully stand silent 
on such a technical defect, and, unbeknownst to the court, freely have contact 
with his victim without fear of criminal prosecution. 
The district court's conclusion in this case was also consistent with the 
well-established line of Idaho cases holding that a defendant in one criminal case 
may not collaterally challenge a judgment of conviction entered in a separate 
criminal proceeding. See State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004) 
(holding that a defendant may only mount a collateral attack to a prior conviction 
utilized to enhance a charge in a new case where the prior conviction was 
obtained in violation of the constitutional right to counsel); State v. Schwab, 153 
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Idaho 325, 281 P.3d 1103 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 836, 25 
P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001). While Weber, Schwab, and Warren concerned attacks 
on prior judgments of conviction, the same policy considerations promoting the 
"confidence in the integrity of [a court's] procedures" is also evident in the context 
of no-contact orders entered in prior criminal cases. 
Finally, as the district court recognized (R., pp.72-74), no Idaho appellate 
court analyzing I.C.R. 46.2 has held that non-compliance with that rule renders a 
no-contact order void. In Cobler, the Idaho Supreme Court held only that the 
magistrate court's failure to comply with the I.C.R. 46.2 expiration date 
requirement entitled Cobler to a modification of the order. Cobler, 48 Idaho at 
771-773, 229 P.3d at 377-378. Hillbroom was similarly entitled to such a 
modification. He was not, however, entitled to violate the order and avoid 
prosecution. 
Hillbroom has failed to show that the the magistrate court's failure to 
include a specific expiration date on the no-contact order rendered his no-contact 
order void. He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred by 
affirming the magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
affirming the magistrate court's denial of Hillbroom's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 2014 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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